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Are media in the U.S. biased? Recent surveys indicated that most Americans think they
are. To take just one example, during the 2008 election only 10% of Republicans, 21%
of independents, and 37% of Democrats said that most reporters tried to oer unbiased
coverage of the campaign (Rasmussen Reports, July 21, 2008).
Charges of a liberal media bias have become particularly common among conservatives
and Republicans. A Google search on \U.S. media" and \liberal bias" yields about 18,500
hits, while a search on \U.S. media" and \conservative bias" yields only about 2,000 hits.
The authors of one of the most prominent articles on the subject (Groseclose and Milyo,
2005) are convinced that the media exhibit a leftward bias. Groseclose states, \I suspected
that many media outlets would tilt to the left because surveys have shown that reporters
tend to vote more Democrat than Republican... But I was surprised at just how pronounced
the distinctions are"; while Milyo states, \there is a quantiable and signicant bias in that
nearly all of them lean to the left".1
There is currently something of a cottage industry among social scientists attempting to
estimate the size and direction of media bias. In addition to Groseclose and Milyo (2005), the
set of recent studies includes Lott and Hassett (2004), Adkins Covert and Wasburn (2007),
Peake (2007), Ho and Quinn (2008), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), Gasper (2011), Larcinese
et al. (2011), Puglisi (2011), and Puglisi and Snyder (2011).2 Most of these papers provide
novel and fairly convincing methods for locating newspapers relative to one another and
relative to politicians. However, none of them provides a compelling way to locate media
outlets relative to the public at large. Two studies attempt to estimate where the \median
voter" or \representative citizen" lies relative to the media outlets (Groseclose and Milyo,
2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010), but in both cases the estimates rely on extremely strong
assumptions. For example, the Groseclose and Milyo method relies on the assumption that
1See http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/Media-Bias-Is-Real-Finds-UCLA-6664.aspx.
2See Prat and Stromberg (2011) for an excellent review of this literature.
3the mean member of the U.S. House of Representatives occupies the same policy position as
the median U.S. voter.3
This paper oers a new and extremely simple method for placing newspapers, interest
groups, political parties, and voters on the same scale. The method uses data on ballot
propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups make en-
dorsements for or against these propositions, and citizens ultimately vote on them. When
an endorser disagrees with a majority of the voters on a proposition, the endorser has clearly
taken a position that is to the left or right of the median voter. We average over these cases
to create an index of conservatism for each newspaper, interest group and party.
Getting straight to the point, we nd that on average newspapers are located almost
exactly at the median voter in their states. In California, where we have the most data,
newspapers are probably slightly to the right of the median voter. These results raise serious
doubts about claims in Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and other work in the academic and
journalistic literature.
Second, we nd that newspapers are moderate relative to interest groups and political
parties. That is, although newspapers exhibit a non-negligible amount of dispersion, they
tend to be much closer to the median voter than most interest groups. This is similar to
results in Ho and Quinn (2008).
Third, we nd interesting dierences across issue areas. In particular, it appears that
newspapers are more liberal than voters on social and cultural issues such as gay marriage,
but they tend to be more conservative on economic issues such as the minimum wage.
Finally, we nd some evidence that the space spanned by newspaper endorsements is
more \multidimensional" than the space spanned by interest group endorsements. When we
scale newspapers and interest groups separately, the amount of variation explained by the
rst factor (or two or three) is much lower for newspapers than for interest groups. This is
interesting because it suggests that newspapers are less ideological than groups, and instead
3See Gasper (2011) for other critiques.
4present a more nuanced, in addition to a more moderate, set of positions. This is dierent
from the ndings in Ho and Quinn (2007), possibly because they focus on judicial decisions
while we study ballot propositions.
Why should we care about these ndings? Numerous theoretical papers show how media
bias can aect voting and other decisions, including Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Bern-
hardt, et al. (2008), and Gehlbach and Sonin (2011). Empirically, Della Vigna and Kaplan
(2007), Gerber et al. (2009), Knight and Chiang (2011), and others nd signicant eects of
media on voting patterns and public opinion. Ho et al. (2008) nd evidence that perceptions
of media bias aect political participation.4 Elite behavior is also likely to be aected. For
example, Scott McClellan (2008) admits that he regularly and routinely lied to the media
while serving as George W. Bush's press secretary. He believes that journalists reported the
lies at least in part because they were afraid of being accused of a liberal bias.
2 Method and Measures
2.1 General Method
We exploit the fact that newspapers and interest groups routinely make endorsements on
ballot propositions, and voters subsequently vote on these same propositions. The most
straightforward { and essentially non-parametric { estimator is dened as follows.
Consider a proposition on an issue for which the \yes" alternative (Y ) is to the right of
the \no" alternative (N). So, Y is the \conservative" position and N is \liberal."
There are three cases, shown in Figure 1 below. In case (a), the median ideal point is
at the \cut-point" between the Y and N alternatives. So, the Y and N alternatives both
receive 50% of the vote. Any newspaper or group that endorses the Y alternative reveals
itself to be more conservative than the median voter on the issue, while any newspaper or
group that endorses the N alternative reveals itself to be more liberal than the median voter.
We can use all endorsements in this case. In practice, we assume that case (a) covers all
4See DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2010) for a survey of the literature on media persuasion.
5ballot measures where the vote percentage for the Y alternative lies between 45% and 55%
(5 percent margin) or between 47% and 53% (3 percent margin).
In case (b) the median ideal point is noticeably to the right of the \cut-point" between
the Y and N alternatives. So, the Y alternative receives noticeably more than 50% of the
vote. Any newspaper that endorses the N alternative reveals itself to be more liberal than
the median voter on the issue. However, a newspaper that endorses the Y alternative might
be more conservative or more liberal than the median voter { newspapers with ideal points
between (N + Y )=2 and M are more liberal than the median voter but still endorse Y . In
other words, in case (b) a \N" endorsement by a given newspaper is informative about its
(relatively) liberal position, since a sizeable subset of citizens to the left of the median vote
for the Y alternative but the newspaper endorses the opposite position. On the other hand,
a \Y " endorsement is not informative, since many citizens both to the left and to right of
the median voter take the same decision.
Case (c) presents the opposition situation to case (b). Now the median ideal point is
noticeably to the left of the \cut-point" between the Y and N alternatives. So, the N
alternative receives noticeably more than 50% of the vote. Any newspaper that endorses
the Y alternative reveals itself to be more conservative than the median voter on the issue.
However, a newspaper that endorses the N alternative might be more liberal or more con-
servative than the median voter { newspapers with ideal points between M and (N + Y )=2
are more conservative than the median voter but still endorse N.
To estimate the bias of a given newspaper, we simply average across all ballot propositions
on which the newspaper made an endorsement. We can use all three cases, case (a) alone,
or cases (b) and (c). We can also weight by newspaper size, or other variables, if desired.
Fortunately, most newspapers make endorsements on all or nearly all propositions, so
sample-selection bias is not a signicant problem. In addition, we can deal with the possibility
that endorsements aect voter behavior by excluding the propositions that nearly pass or
nearly fail, i.e. case (a).
62.2 Specic Measures
We now provide more precise descriptions of the specic measures we use below. First, we
need a bit of notation. Let S be the set of all states. For each state s, let Ns be the set of
newspapers in s. Let N be the set of all newspapers in all states.
For each newspaper n, let Pn be the set of all propositions on which n endorsed. Let C be
the set of propositions that pass or fail by a \close" margin, and let L be the complement of
C. In the analysis below we report results for two dierent thresholds for dening a \close"
outcome, 52% and 55%; the results are similar for other thresholds.
Let cnp = 1 if newspaper n endorsed the conservative position on proposition p and
cnp =  1 if newspaper n endorsed the liberal position. Similarly, let vp = 1 if voters adopted
the conservative position on proposition p and vp =  1 if voters adopted the liberal position.
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Notice that Right of Median = +1 if newspaper endorsements are \entirely conservative"
(when they disagree with the majority of voters), Right of Median =  1 if the newspaper
endorsements in state s are \entirely liberal,' and Right of Median = 0 if newspaper endorse-
ments, relative to the median voters in their respective states, \neutral" on average. This
measure uses all endorsements by all newspapers.
We also study a modication of this variable after omitting the propositions that pass or
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Finally, we also examine the following measure for the propositions that pass or fail by
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7Again, Conservative Position = +1 if newspaper endorsements on close propositions are
\entirely conservative," Conservative Position =  1 if newspaper endorsements on close
propositions are \entirely liberal", and Conservative Position = 0 if newspaper endorsements
on close propositions are, relative to the median voters in their respective states, on average
\neutral."
We can construct analogous measures for each newspaper, and for each state, simply by
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We dene the variables Conservative Positions and Conservative Positionn analogously,
averaging over close propositions.
To measure the degree to which a newspaper is extreme or moderate we use absolute
deviations { i.e., for each bias measure, we take the absolute value of the measure for each














where N is the number of newspapers. These variables range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing
the most moderate possible position and larger values represent more extremism. We also
compute these variables for interest groups, in order to compare newspapers and groups.
In addition to the relatively non-parametric measures above, we can also estimate factor-
analytic models analogous to those used to scale roll-call data. We apply the linear model
8proposed in Heckman and Snyder (1997).5 We call the estimated ideological positions based
on this approach Linear Factor Scores. These rely much more heavily on specic functional
form assumptions, but, as we will see, produce similar estimates and the same substantive
conclusions. We compute these scores only for California, where the number of endorsements
is suciently large to have condence in the estimates.
2.3 What If Endorsements Inuence Voters?
We are not too worried about the inuence newspaper endorsements might have on voters,
for three reasons. First, most previous studies that employ compelling research designs nd
that newspaper endorsements have only a small eect on voters' decisions. Second, since
even the largest newspaper in a state is read by only a minority of the state's households, in
order for newspaper endorsements to inuence the aggregate state outcome on a proposition
it would have to be the case that many newspapers in the state endorse the same alternative
on the proposition { or, more accurately, that a large fraction of voters in the state read
newspapers endorsing the same alternative.
Third, if newspaper endorsements actually do have a signicant impact on voting out-
comes, then our main estimates are most likely to be biased toward nding that newspapers
are even more extreme than they really are, in the direction of their true bias. Thus, we will
be even less likely to place newspapers on the \wrong side" of voters relative to their true
positions, compared to a world where endorsements do not inuence voting outcomes.
Why? Because we only include cases where newspapers endorsed the position that a
majority of voters did not support. We drop all propositions on which newspapers are
aligned with the majority of voters. We therefore need only one assumption to sign the bias:
Assume that \surprising" newspaper endorsements are more likely to inuence voters than
\expected" newspaper endorsements. That is, assume that a liberal endorsement by a con-
servative newspaper is more inuential than a conservative endorsement by that newspaper,
5An alternative to the linear model is Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) Nominate model. Ho and Quinn
(2007) also use a scaling model, but take a Bayesian approach.
9and a conservative endorsement by a liberal newspaper is more inuential than a liberal
endorsement by that newspaper. This seems quite natural, and Knight and Chiang (2011)
nd strong evidence for this in their study of presidential endorsements.
The following example shows how newspaper inuence biases our measure of bias. Con-
sider a newspaper n that is more conservative than voters. Suppose the probability that
voters would support the conservative position on proposition p in the absence of an en-
dorsement by n is Prob(vp = 1jcnp = 0) = Qv. Suppose that if n endorses the conser-
vative position on the proposition then it has no eect on Qv (since this is the newspa-
per's expected behavior); but if n endorses the liberal position, then it reduces the prob-
ability that will voters support the conservative position on the proposition to Qv  e,
where e 2 (0;Qv) measures how strongly endorsements aect voters. That is, suppose
Prob(vp = 1jcnp = 1) = Qv and Prob(vp = 1jcnp =  1) = Qv e. Finally, since the news-
paper is conservative relative to voters, suppose the probability it endorses the conservative
position is Prob(cnp = 1) = Qnp > Qv. Given that the newspaper makes an endorsement,





We drop the rst and last cases, where the majority of voters and the newspaper agree.
Thus, newspaper n's conservatism score will be a strictly monotonic function of:
(e) = Prob(nisRightofMedian) =
(1 Qv)Qnp
(1 Qv)Qnp + (Qv e)(1 Qnp)
Clearly, this is increasing in e. That is, the more inuence newspaper n has on voting
decisions, the more conservative it will appear. Note that if newspaper endorsements do not
10inuence voters at all, so e = 0, then (e) takes on its smallest possible value:
(0) = Prob(nisRightofMedian) =
(1 Qv)Qnp
(1 Qv)Qnp + Qv(1 Qnp)
Clearly, (0) > 1=2, since Qnp > Qv { that is, if newpaper endorsements do not inuence
voters, then newspaper n is more likely to be observed to the right of voters than to the left
of voters. As e increases from 0 toward Qv, (e) increases from (0) toward 1. A symmetric
argument holds for newspapers that are more liberal than voters.
3 Data
We have collected endorsement data for all states over the period 1996-2010. In section
4.1 below we use all of the available data. We have enough data to conduct state-by-state
analyses for Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Oregon, and Washington. We focus on
these states in section 4.3 below.6 The ballot propositions cover a wide range of public policy
issues { overall state taxes and spending, local taxes and spending, education policy, health
policy, energy policy, labor policy, environmental policy, criminal justice, drugs, abortion,
gay marriage, treatment of animals, gun control, campaign nance, election rules, and more.
We have collected endorsements for all newspapers with circulation over 20,000 plus
a sample of smaller newspapers. We have also collected endorsements by state and county
political party organizations, and by a large sample of interest groups. The sample of interest
groups includes the major business, labor, environmental, public interest, and taxpayer
groups, as well as some prominent blogs.
Our sample includes nearly 23,000 endorsements. Table 1 shows a few summary statistics
by state. We only include states with at least 5 ballot propositions and newspapers that
made at least 5 endorsements. Thus we end up with data for 44 states.7
6We also considered expanding the state-level analyses to include Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas. However,
while these states have a large number of propositions many of them are not controversial and/or deal
with local issues; as a result, there are relatively few propositions on which prominent interest groups take
positions.
7The states excluded from the analysis are: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas,
Mississippi and Vermont.
11Most of the endorsements are not used in constructing the Right of Median measures,
because in most instances the newspaper endorsement agrees with the position taken by a
majority of voters. That is, most endorsements fall into cases (b) and (c) above. This is true
for 65% of all endorsements. Recall also that we only use close propositions { i.e., those with
a winning percentage less than 53% or 55% { when constructing the ConservativePosition
measures. Only 10% of propositions are close, accounting for 10% of endorsements. In the
factor analysis, we drop newspapers or groups that made fewer than 10 endorsements, but
we use all of the available endorsements for the included endorsers.
We employ two methods to infer whether the \Yes" or \No" alternative on a given
proposition represents the conservative position. The most straightforward is to use the
endorsements of political parties. If the Republican Party supports a proposition and the
Democratic Party opposes it, then the \Yes" alternative is the conservative position, and
when the opposite holds the \No" alternative is the conservative position. We call this the
\Party-Based" classication.
Unfortunately, in many states the parties rarely make clear recommendations on ballot
propositions. An alternative is to use the endorsements of interest groups that are clearly
identied as liberal or conservative. We classify labor unions, environmental groups, animal-
rights groups, and self-identied progressive groups and blogs as liberal, and we classify
business associations, taxpayer groups, and self-identied conservative groups and blogs as
conservative. If at least 60% of the conservative groups support a proposition and at least
60% of the liberal groups oppose it, then the \Yes" alternative is the conservative position,
and when the opposite holds the \No" alternative is the conservative position.8 We call this
the \Group-Based" classication.
8We only classify the propositions for which we have the endorsements of at least 2 liberal groups and at
least 2 conservative groups.
124 Results
4.1 Average Bias and Extremism
We begin with an overall assessment of newspapers in all states in our sample. We also
analyze California separately, since it accounts for nearly half of the endorsements.
Table 2 presents our main estimates of the average bias among newspapers. The rst
column shows results for all states pooled, the second is for California alone, and the third
pools all states excluding California. Each row presents the gures for a dierent measure of
bias or a dierent sample. Each cell contains three numbers: the measure itself, the standard
error of the measure (in parentheses), and the number of observations { i.e., endorsements
{ used to compute the measure (in brackets).9
Examining the table we see immediately that none of the point estimates are statistically
dierent from zero at the .05 level; in fact, none of the point estimates are signicant even
at the .20 level. The second row is the most comprehensive, since it is employs the Group-
Based classication of propositions and it uses all endorsements for which Right of Median
is not missing. According to this row, the average ideological orientation of newspaper
endorsements relative to voters is 0.03 { essentially zero. Thus, on average newspapers in
the U.S. are very close to the median voters in their states. There is no evidence of a large
and systematic liberal or conservative bias. If anything, newspapers tend to be very slightly
on the conservative side of the median.10
In California we can use both the Party-Based and Group-Based classications of proposi-
tions. Using the Party-Based classication, newspapers in California appear to be somewhat
conservative relative to the state median voter (top row of Table 2). However, the estimate
9The standard errors are clustered both by newspaper and proposition (see Cameron et al., 2011). We
compute the standard errors this way because it seems likely that the error terms across endorsements are
correlated within newspaper and also within proposition.
10Throughout the discussion of our results, we use the term \the median voter." We do not literally mean
a single individual who is the median voter on all propositions. Rather, we are referring to a hypothetical
\average median voter" { a composite of actual median voters that probably vary from issue to issue and
election to election { to whom endorsers are compared.
13is not statistically dierent from zero.
In rows 3-6 of Table 2 we keep only propositions that won or lost by a non-negligible
margin. In these cases it is very unlikely that any individual endorsement { or even a
coordinated collection of endorsements { would change the outcome of the vote. Again,
none of the estimates is statistically signicant, and newspaper endorsement positions are,
on average, very close to the median voters in their states.
Finally, in rows 7-10 of the Table we focus on propositions that won or lost by a small
margin. In these rows the bias measure is Conservative Position. Recall that this is computed
using all endorsements, even those that are on the same side of the median voter. In these
cases newspapers appear to be slightly to the left of the median voter, although again the
point estimates are not signicantly dierent from zero even at the .20 level.
Table 3 presents the main estimates of the average absolute deviation in bias, for both
newspapers and groups. The format is similar to that in Table 2, although in this table the
units of observation are endorsers rather than endorsements.11
The table shows clearly that newspapers tend to be much more moderate than interest
groups. On average, the absolute position of groups is about 0.80, while the average for
newspapers is only about 0.30. So, groups are on average much closer to the theoretical
boundaries of our measures (-1 and +1) than newspapers.
We might worry that the measures based on the Group-Based classication method
is biased for groups, since many of these groups are used both in the measure and also
in determining which alternatives are conservative and which are liberal. However, the
Party-Based measure does not suer from this potential bias, since we only use political
parties to identify the conservative and liberal side of each proposition.12 As Table 3 shows,
for California the Party-Based and Group-Based measures of absolute deviation are quite
similar. In fact, the Party-Based measure is slightly larger than the Group-Based measure,
which is the opposite of what we would expect if the bias due to the \double use" of groups
11Thus, the standard errors in this table are not clustered.
12Note, parties are not treated as endorsers when computing any of the measures.
14was a large problem. Thus, we are not too worried about this potential bias.
4.2 Variation in Bias Across Issues
Table 4 shows how voters and newspapers locate on a number of salient issues. For voters,
the rst number in each cell is the fraction of propositions on each issue for which a majority
of voters supported the conservative position. The number in parenthesis is the number of
propositions on the issue. For newspapers, the rst number in each cell is the fraction of
endorsements on each issue for which the newspaper endorsed the conservative position, and
the number in parentheses is the total number of endorsements on the issue.
On some issues newspapers appear clearly to the left of the median voter. Gay rights,
especially gay marriage, is a conspicuous example in recent years. Between 1996 and 2010
there were a number of propositions clearly dealing with gay rights. A majority of voters
supported the (conservative) anti-gay rights alternative on nearly 90% of these. Newspapers,
however, endorsed this alternative only 10% of the time. Another example is making English
the ocial state language and/or requiring that all classes in public schools be taught in
English. A majority of voters supported the (conservative) pro-English language alternative
on 70% of these propositions. Newspapers, however, endorsed the conservative alternative
less than 20% of the time.
On other issues, however, newspaper endorsements appear to be to the right of the median
voter. This is especially true for propositions on the minimum wage, health care, smoking,
and the environment. For example, a majority of voters supported the (conservative) anti-
minimum wage position on only 14% of the propositions, while newspapers endorsed this
alternative almost 80% of the time.
Interestingly, on measures dealing with abortion, newspapers take the conservative posi-
tion about as often as the median voter.
It is tempting to speculate on these patterns. Overall, newspapers appear to be relatively
liberal on social/cultural issues, but relatively conservative on issues with a salient economic
15component. This is consistent with a world in which newspaper owners allow their editors
and journalists { who tend to be liberal { to take a liberal stance on social/cultural issues,
but not on economic issues, on which the owners themselves and advertisers may have a
larger stake.13
4.3 Relative Positions of Individual Newspapers and Groups
In Figure 1, and Appendix Table A.1, we show California-based interest groups, newspapers,
and voters. Note that we include voters from the six largest counties, treating each county
as a single \endorser." In Figure 1 the endorsers are divided into 7 groups based on their
Group-Based Right of Median scores. The gure is divided into two panels, with interest
groups, parties, and county median voters on top, and newspapers on the bottom.
In Table A.1 the endorsers are ordered according to their Linear Factor Scores (the
rst dimension in the factor analysis described at the end of section 2.1), from the most
conservative to the most liberal. To help distinguish between the dierent types of endorsers,
we use the following letters in the second column: N = newspapers, G = interest groups,
P = political parties, V = the statewide median voter, C = various county median voters,
and S = \specialty" newspapers.14 In addition, we use a normal font for interest groups
and parties, a bold-faced font for newspapers and an italic font for voters. Column 3 shows
Linear Factor Scores, while columns 4 and 5 show the Party-Based and Group-Based Right
of Median scores, respectively. We only report these scores for endorsers with at least 25
non-missing observations (recall that these are missing whenever an endorser agrees with the
median voter on a proposition).
Inspection of Figure 1 immediately reveals that newspapers in California are more mod-
13This is similar in spirit to Baron's (2006) model of supply-driven media bias, which is based on the
following exchange: the owners of media outlets permit journalists to publish news stories that are slanted
toward their ideological positions, and in turn the journalists accept lower wages. We thank Bob Erikson for
suggesting this interpretation.
14We classify the Daily Californian, Metro Silicon Valley, Monterey County Weekly, and San Francisco Bay
Guardian as \specialty" newspapers. For example, the Daily Californian is the newspaper of the University
of California at Berkeley.
16erate than interest groups { the groups tend to be located in the most extreme bins, while
newspapers are concentrated in the intermediate bins. Even newspapers, however, exhibit
a bi-modal distribution, with more moderately liberal and moderately conservative than
centrist newspapers.
Table A.1 shows a similar pattern: endorsers with bold-faced fonts are concentrated in the
middle of the table, with normal fonts at the top and at the bottom. Moreover, newspapers
are on average located to the right of the overall California median voter.
According to the Right of Median scores, the press in California is extremely balanced,
with 26 newspapers to the right of the median voter and 24 to the left. The Linear Factor
Scores suggest instead a conservative bias. Based on this measure, the median newspaper in
California is evidently to the right of the median voter: 30 newspapers have Linear Factor
Scores to the right of the median voter's score, while only 23 newspapers have scores to the
left.
Interestingly, Figure 1 and Table A.1 also suggest that newspapers based in a given
county tend to be more moderate than the median voter living in that county, at least for
the largest counties. For example, in Figure 1 the Orange County median voter is to the
right of the Orange County Register and the San Diego County median voter is to the right
of the San Diego Union-Tribune, while the San Francisco County median voter is to the
left of both the San Francisco Chronicle and San Francisco Examiner. Also, the Alameda
County median voter is more extreme than the Oakland Tribune and Alameda Times-Star,
although both newspapers are on the opposite side of the statewide median (the median
voter in the county is to the left of the statewide median, while the two newspapers are to
the right).15
Two counties that appear in Table A.1 are missing from Figure 1 { Los Angeles County
and Santa Clara County. They are missing because there was not a single proposition in
15There is only one case where the conclusion based on Right of Median scores diers from that based on
the Linear Factor Scores. According to the Linear Factor Scores, the median voter in San Diego County is
more moderate than the San Diego Union-Tribune.
17our sample for which the majority of voters in these counties disagreed with the majority
of voters in the state, so we cannot compute their Right of Median scores. Based on their
Linear Factor Scores, however, we see that the Los Angeles County median voter is located
to the left of the Los Angeles Times, and the Santa Clara County median voter is (very
slightly) to the left of the San Jose Mercury News.
Figure 2 is analogous to Figure 1, presenting the estimates for Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Oregon, and Washington. To condense the presentation, we combine the states in one gure
{ recall, however, that the estimates for each state are computed separately, and for each
state the positions of the endorsers are always relative to the state's median voter. In the
Appendix there is a separate table for each state { Tables A.2 to A.6. These have the same
format as Table A.1 except that they do not have a column for the Party-Based Right of
Median measure.
Overall, the patterns for the ve other states are similar to those for California. In all
states it is clear that most of the newspapers are more moderate than most of the interest
groups. In fact, the pooled distribution of newspapers is more centrist than in California,
exhibiting a uni-modal rather than a bimodal distribution. Note that the mode is slight
right of center, however, and there is still a substantial amount of dispersion.
Turning briey to the state-by-state tables in the Appendix, we see the following. Recall
that we focus exclusively on the Group-Based Right of Median scores for these states, since
there are relatively few endorsements in each state. In Oregon more newspapers are clearly
to the left of the median voter than to the right { 4 newspapers have Right of Median scores
below zero and 1 has a score above zero. In Arizona and Colorado there is also a slight
bias to the left. In Arizona, 4 newspapers have negative scores and 3 have positive scores,
while in Colorado the numbers are 6 and 4, respectively. In Florida and Washington, on
the other hand, the newspapers display a conservative bias. In Florida, only 2 newspapers
have negative Right of Median scores but 17 have positive scores. In Washington, only 1
newspaper has a negative score, while 11 have positive scores.
184.4 Multidimensional Newspapers, Ideological Groups?
Finally, our data also suggest that the space of newspaper endorsements is more multidi-
mensional than the space of interest group endorsements, at least in California. This can be
seen from the factor analysis, in two ways.
First, when we scale newspapers and interest groups together, we nd that newspapers
tend to have higher absolute scores on factors 2-5 than interest groups. That is, newspa-
per endorsements \tap into" these higher dimensions more than group endorsements. The
average absolute score on factors 2-5 for groups in California is 0.15, while the average for
newspapers is 0.22 { this is, nearly 50% larger.
Second, when we scale newspapers and interest groups separately, we nd that the rst
factor accounts for a much larger share of the total variation in the endorsing behavior of
groups than in the endorsing behavior of newspapers. For interest groups, the rst factor
accounts for 53% of the variance, while for newspapers the rst factor only explains 16%.
The pattern is reversed for dimensions 2-5: for interest groups, these factors account for an
additional 25% of the variance, while for newspapers these factors account for an additional
33%.
Thus, overall, interest groups appear more one-dimensional, or \ideological", than news-
papers. In the case of newspapers, even using ve factors we are only able to explain 50% of
the total variance in endorsements. For interest groups, ve factors account for nearly 80%
of the total variance in endorsements.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose and apply a new, simple method to locate voters, newspapers,
interest groups, and parties in the same ideological space. This method exploits the fact
that newspapers, interest groups and parties routinely take positions on ballot propositions,
and voters ultimately vote on them. By tracing out where newspapers are located with
19respect to political parties and the median voter on the dierent propositions, we are able
to accurately assess previous claims about the degree and direction of media bias in the
United States. Our ndings casts strong doubts on the claim that U.S. newspapers exhibit
an overall leftward bias. On the contrary, we nd that newspapers appear to be distributed
symmetrically around the median voter.
Our analysis also shows that newspapers are more centrist than interest groups, and that
their \bliss points" are probably located in a policy space that is more multidimensional
than the one spanned by interest groups. This suggests that the considerations underlying
newspaper endorsements dier from those that drive groups. To the extent that newspapers
have dierent goals and face dierent incentives than interest groups, it is probably a mistake
to treat the press simply as another type of interest group.
It is important to stress that the data and the methods employed here only allow us
to place the editorial sections of newspapers relative to voters. To complete the picture, it
would be interesting to locate the news section of each newspaper relative to its editorial
section. This might be done using one of the existing methods, such as that in Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2010), based on language similarity.
Another interesting extension is to use our method to locate individual politicians on the
same ideological space where we have placed interest groups and newspapers. This is feasible
for the subset of politicians who take clear public positions on enough ballot propositions.
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22Table 1: Summary Statistics
State # Props # News State # Props # News
Alabama 62 13 Nebraska 51 3
Alaska 43 3 Nevada 65 3
Arizona 95 8 New Hampshire 8 2
Arkansas 36 3 New Jersey 26 13
California 175 56 New Mexico 74 6
Colorado 97 22 New York 11 12
Florida 59 33 North Carolina 13 10
Georgia 59 8 North Dakota 43 6
Hawaii 26 3 Ohio 30 16
Idaho 27 6 Oklahoma 60 4
Indiana 10 10 Oregon 151 14
Iowa 9 8 Pennsylvania 10 16
Kansas 6 6 Rhode Island 51 1
Kentucky 8 7 South Carolina 35 8
Louisiana 119 8 South Dakota 50 5
Maine 97 2 Tennessee 7 11
Maryland 22 12 Texas 109 25
Massachusetts 25 13 Utah 38 5
Michigan 28 18 Virginia 24 12
Minnesota 7 5 Washington 77 18
Missouri 50 11 West Virginia 10 8
Montana 44 4 Wisconsin 8 13
23Table 2: Average Bias of Newspapers
Measure All States California Non-Calif
All Propositions
Right of Median (Party-Based) 0.14 (0.16) [994]
Right of Median (Group-Based) 0.03 (0.08) [2909] 0.03 (0.13) [1405] 0.03 (0.08) [1504]
Non-Close Props, 5% Marg
Right of Median (Party-Based) 0.21 (0.20) [530]
Right of Median (Group-Based) 0.05 (0.09) [1797] 0.12 (0.16) [814] -0.01 (0.09) [983]
Non-Close Props, 3% Marg
Right of Median (Party-Based) 0.22 (0.17) [788]
Right of Median (Group-Based) 0.04 (0.08) [2345] 0.09 (0.14) [1152] -0.00 (0.09) [1193]
Close Props, 5% Margin
Conserv. Posit. (Party-Based) -0.04 (0.14) [1012]
Conserv. Posit. (Group-Based) -0.04 (0.07) [2369] 0.00 (0.11) [1311] -0.09 (0.08) [1058]
Close Props, 3% Margin
Conserv. Posit. (Party-Based) -0.14 (0.22) [497]
Conserv. Posit. (Group-Based) -0.11 (0.10) [1259] -0.07 (0.18) [618] -0.14 (0.10) [641]
Notes: Each row presents the gures for a dierent measure of bias or a dierent sample. Each
cell contains three numbers: the measure itself, the standard error of the measure (in parentheses),
and the number of endorsements used to compute the measure (in brackets). The standard errors
are clustered both by newspaper and proposition.
24Table 3: Absolute Deviation of Bias, Newspapers and Groups
Measure All States California Non-Calif
Newspapers
jRight of Med.j (Party-Based) 0.32 (0.03) [53]
jRight of Med.j (Group-Based) 0.30 (0.02) [159] 0.28 (0.02) [55] 0.31 (0.02) [104]
jConserv. Pos.j (Party-Based) 0.24 (0.02) [56]
jConserv. Pos.j (Group-Based) 0.29 (0.01) [236] 0.23 (0.02) [56] 0.31 (0.02) [180]
Interest Groups
jRight of Med.j (Party-Based) 0.87 (0.03) [43]
jRight of Med.j (Group-Based) 0.82 (0.02) [139] 0.82 (0.04) [45] 0.82 (0.03) [94]
jConserv. Pos.j (Party-Based) 0.76 (0.03) [46]
jConserv. Pos.j (Group-Based) 0.79 (0.02) [209] 0.73 (0.04) [46] 0.81 (0.02) [163]
Notes: Each row presents the gures for a dierent measure of absolute deviation of bias. Each
cell contains three numbers: the measure itself, the standard error of the measure (in parentheses),
and the number of endorsers used to compute the measure (in brackets).
25Table 4: Fraction Conservative on Various Issues
Issue Voters Newspapers Dierence
Gay Rights, Marriage 0.89 (38) 0.10 (257) 0.79
English Language 0.70 (10) 0.17 (80) 0.52
Armative Action 0.60 (5) 0.15 (85) 0.45
Term Limits 0.77 (30) 0.39 (183) 0.37
Crime 0.71 (17) 0.49 (365) 0.22
Taxes 0.45 (84) 0.36 (729) 0.09
Abortion 0.15 (13) 0.23 (211) -0.07
Education 0.34 (32) 0.48 (512) -0.14
Labor Relations 0.30 (20) 0.53 (252) -0.23
Animal Rights 0.32 (22) 0.58 (199) -0.26
Marijuana 0.41 (22) 0.68 (145) -0.27
School Choice, Vouchers 0.10 (10) 0.37 (94) -0.27
Environment, Pollution 0.26 (23) 0.55 (310) -0.28
Health Care 0.32 (31) 0.61 (510) -0.29
Smoking 0.00 (8) 0.30 (82) -0.30
Minimum Wage 0.14 (14) 0.79 (122) -0.64
Notes: In the Voters column the rst number in each cell is the fraction of propositions on
each issue for which a majority of voters supported the conservative position, and the number in
parenthesis is the number of propositions on the issue. In the Newspapers column, the rst number
in each cell is the fraction of endorsements on each issue for which the newspaper endorsed the
conservative position, and the number in parentheses is the total number of endorsements on the
issue.
26Table A.1: Conservative vs. Liberal Endorsers in California
Linear Party-Based Group-Based
Endorser Type Factor Score Right of Med Right of Med
CA Republican Party P 1.13 1.00 0.94
CA Taxpayers Assoc G 1.10 1.00 0.91
Howard Jarvis Taxpayer Assoc G 1.09 0.90 0.90
Alameda Co Taxpayer Assoc G 1.07 1.00 1.00
CA Farm Bureau G 1.06 0.83 0.88
Contra Costa Taxpayers Assoc G 1.03 0.81 0.81
CA Manuf and Technology Assoc G 1.03 0.83 0.86
Orange Co Taxpayers Assoc G 0.97 0.76 0.43
Orange County Voters C 0.95 1.00 1.00
Placerville Mountain Democrat N 0.95 0.85 0.60
Torrance Daily Breeze N 0.90 0.43 0.44
Santa Barbara News Press N 0.86 0.43 0.25
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin N 0.86 0.33 0.27
Citizens For A Better America G 0.86 0.91 0.52
Natl Taxpayers Union G 0.86 1.00 1.00
Long Beach Press-Telegram N 0.86 0.59 0.53
Orange County Register N 0.83 0.77 0.67
San Diego Union-Tribune N 0.82 0.48 0.32
CA Libertarian Party G 0.82 0.76 0.63
Lodi News-Sentinel N 0.82 0.67 0.54
CA Chamber of Commerce G 0.80 0.48 0.56
Los Angeles Daily News N 0.80 0.46 0.45
Chico Enterprise Record N 0.77 0.29 0.14
Riverside Press-Enterprise N 0.74 0.17 0.26
Redding Record Searchlight N 0.70 0.24 0.24
San Diego County Voters C 0.68 1.00 1.00
North County Times N 0.67 0.43 0.25
San Bernardino County Sun N 0.67 0.29 0.22
Pasadena Star-News N 0.67 0.33 0.30
Alameda Times-Star N 0.62 0.43 0.20
San Mateo County Times N 0.62 0.14 0.05
Hayward Daily Review N 0.62 0.38 0.16
Whittier Daily News N 0.62 0.33 0.38
Fremont-Newark Argus N 0.59 0.27 0.06
Pleasanton Tri-Valley Herald N 0.59 0.47 0.04
Oakland Tribune N 0.53 0.29 0.23
San Gabriel Valley Tribune N 0.49 0.33 0.11
Contra Costa Times N 0.42 0.08 0.17
27Table A.1 (continued)
Linear Party-Based Group-Based
Endorser Type Factor Score Right of Med Right of Med
Woodland Daily Democrat N 0.40 0.56 -0.07
Gilroy Dispatch N 0.33 0.30 0.11
Bakerseld Californian N 0.30 -0.05 -0.09
Santa Cruz Sentinel N 0.30 -0.14 -0.16
Madera Tribune N 0.27 . .
San Luis Obispo Tribune N 0.25 . 0.25
Voters V 0.15 . .
Vallejo Times-Herald N 0.13 0.00 -0.14
Palm Springs Desert Sun N 0.09 -0.38 -0.20
Vacaville Reporter N 0.08 -0.25 -0.20
Red Blu Daily News N 0.07 0.27 0.17
Los Angeles Times N 0.07 -0.23 -0.22
League of California Cities G 0.04 . -0.08
Santa Rosa Press Democrat N -0.07 -0.30 -0.26
Ventura County Star N -0.10 -0.25 -0.31
Stockton Record N -0.10 . -0.33
Merced Sun-Star N -0.12 0.00 -0.26
La Prensa San Diego N -0.13 0.07 -0.15
Eureka Times-Standard N -0.14 0.00 -0.33
Visalia Times-Delta N -0.15 0.00 -0.09
Lompoc Record N -0.15 0.00 -0.38
Modesto Bee N -0.16 -0.13 -0.24
San Francisco Examiner N -0.18 -0.60 -0.50
Sonoma Index-Tribune N -0.19 -0.14 -0.33
Pacic Sun N -0.25 -0.33 -0.60
Fresno Bee N -0.26 -0.38 -0.38
San Jose Mercury News N -0.26 -0.50 -0.44
Sacramento Bee N -0.27 -0.31 -0.20
San Francisco Chronicle N -0.28 -0.52 -0.48
Santa Clara County Voters C -0.29 . .
Los Angeles County Voters C -0.32 . .
Metro Silicon Valley S -0.45 -0.50 -0.70
Salinas Californian N -0.47 -0.12 -0.26
Daily Californian S -0.57 -0.25 -0.37
Alameda County Voters C -0.68 -1.00 -1.00
Monterey County Herald N -0.70 -0.60 -0.68
CA Peace and Freedom Party G -0.73 -0.52 -0.62
CA Green Party G -0.85 -0.68 -0.80
28Table A.1 (continued)
Linear Party-Based Group-Based
Endorser Type Factor Score Right of Med Right of Med
CA Teachers Assoc G -0.88 -1.00 -0.86
Monterey County Weekly S -0.88 -0.82 -0.78
CA Church Impact G -0.89 -0.82 -0.89
CA League of Conservation Voters G -0.91 -1.00 -0.75
CA AFSCME G -0.95 -1.00 -0.90
San Francisco County Voters C -0.97 -1.00 -0.92
CA Nurses Assoc G -0.98 -0.90 -0.83
Calitics G -0.99 -1.00 -1.00
Speak Out California G -1.01 . .
CA Democratic Party P -1.03 -1.00 -1.00
Natl Organization For Women G -1.03 -1.00 -1.00
Friends Comm On Legislation G -1.04 -0.91 -0.94
Ballot Initiative Strategy Center G -1.05 -1.00 -1.00
CA League of Women Voters G -1.07 -1.00 -1.00
San Francisco Bay Guardian S -1.07 -0.85 -0.90
CA Sierra Club G -1.07 -1.00 -1.00
CA Federation of Teachers G -1.10 -1.00 -1.00
CA SEIU G -1.10 -1.00 -1.00
CA Labor Federation G -1.10 -1.00 -0.95
29Table A.2: Conservative vs.
Liberal Endorsers in Arizona
Group-Based
Endorser Type Right of Med
Natl Taxpayers Union G 1.00
Arizona Conservative G 0.88
AZ Farm Bureau G 0.83
AZ Chamber of Commerce & Industry G 0.82
AZ Federation of Taxpayers G 0.56
Prescott Daily Courier N 0.53
Yuma Sun N 0.22
AZ Libertarian Party G 0.17
Flagsta Arizona Daily Sun N 0.11
Tri-Valley Dispatch N 0.06
East Valley Tribune N -0.04
Phoenix Arizona Republic N -0.08
Tucson Arizona Daily Star N -0.50
Tucson Citizen N -0.53
AZ AFL-CIO G -0.70
AZ Green Party G -0.79
AZ Advocacy Network G -1.00
AZ Democratic Party P -1.00
Ballot Initiative Strategy Center G -1.00
Blog For Arizona G -1.00
30Table A.3: Conservative vs.
Liberal Endorsers in Colorado
Group-Based
Endorser Type Right of Med
CO Farm Bureau G 0.60
Colorado Springs Gazette N 0.58
Pueblo Chieftain N 0.50
Denver Rocky Mountain News N 0.37
Wheat Ridge Transcript N 0.33
Grand Junction Daily Sentinel N 0.29
CO Libertarian Party G 0.27
Fort Morgan Times N 0.11
Golden Transcript N 0.00
Greeley Daily Tribune N 0.00
Denver Post N -0.06
Arvada Press N -0.11
Lakewood Sentinel N -0.11
Summit Daily News N -0.14
Longmont Daily Times-Call N -0.16
Fort Collins Coloradoan N -0.25
Loveland Daily Reporter-Herald N -0.25
Boulder Daily Camera N -0.45
Steamboat Pilot N -0.50
Durango Herald N -0.56
Colorado Springs Independent S -0.67
Progress Now Co G -1.00
31Table A.4: Conservative vs.
Liberal Endorsers in Florida
Group-Based
Endorser Type Right of Med
FL Chamber of Commerce G 1.00
James Madison Institute G 1.00
Jacksonville Florida Times-Union N 0.85
Jupiter Courier N 0.75
Fort Pierce Tribune N 0.40
FL Libertarian Party G 0.38
Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel N 0.33
Stuart Treasure Coast News N 0.33
Vero Beach Press Journal N 0.33
Naples Daily News N 0.27
Ocala Star-Banner N 0.27
Orlando Sentinel N 0.26
Fort Myers News Press N 0.23
Melbourne Florida Today N 0.17
Miami Herald N 0.12
Tampa Tribune N 0.12
Bradenton Herald N 0.09
Lakeland Ledger N 0.09
Pensacola News Journal N 0.07
Tallahassee Democrat N 0.06
Sarasota Herald-Tribune N 0.00
Daytona Beach News-Journal N -0.06
Palm Beach Post N -0.07
FL League of Women Voters G -0.09
St. Petersburg Times N -0.29
32Table A.5: Conservative vs.
Liberal Endorsers in Oregon
Group-Based
Endorser Type Right of Med
Christian Coalition of OR G 1.00
Natl Taxpayers Union G 1.00
OR Libertarian Party G 1.00
OR Taxpayers United G 1.00
Parents Education Assoc G 1.00
Taxpayers Assoc of OR G 1.00
Victoria Taft G 1.00
OR Farm Bureau G 0.88
Assoc Oregon Industries G 0.80
Albany Democrat-Herald N 0.27
Baker City Herald N 0.25
Klamath Falls Herald and News N 0.25
Salem Statesman Journal N 0.00
Portland Oregonian N -0.09
Corvallis Gazette Times N -0.11
Medford Mail-Tribune N -0.29
Gresham Outlook N -0.40
OR Business Assoc G -0.50
Pacic Green Party of OR G -0.69
Eugene Register-Guard N -0.76
Eugene Weekly S -0.76
Daily Astorian N -0.78
Ecumenical Ministries of OR G -0.83
OR AFL-CIO G -1.00
OR AFSCME G -1.00
OR Democratic Party P -1.00
OR Education Assoc G -1.00
OR Federation of Teachers G -1.00
OR SEIU G -1.00
Oregon Action G -1.00
33Table A.6: Conservative vs.
Liberal Endorsers in Washington
Group-Based
Endorser Type Right of Med
Centralia Chronicle N 1.00
Natl Taxpayers Union G 1.00
Sound Politics G 1.00
WA Eagle Forum G 1.00
Kent South County Journal N 0.67
Bellevue East Side Journal N 0.60
Assoc of WA Business G 0.57
Greater Seattle Chamber of Commerce G 0.50
Longview Daily News N 0.50
Spokane Spokesman Review N 0.50
WA Research Council G 0.45
Yakima Herald-Republic N 0.43
Vancouver Columbian N 0.41
Bellingham Herald N 0.40
Kitsap Sun N 0.25
Seattle Times N 0.20
Tacoma News Tribune N 0.20
Olympia Olympian N 0.07
Lewiston Tribune N -0.25
Seattle Post-Intelligencer N -0.38
The Stranger S -0.50
WA State Labor Council G -0.86
Lindas Guide G -1.00
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